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MOVING FORWARD WITH THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: USING 
POLITICAL INERTIA TO PROTECT 
CIVILIANS 
Steven J. Rose* 
Abstract: First formulated in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect has 
emerged onto the international legal landscape. This doctrine recently 
was expressed in the 2011 United Nations-authorized humanitarian inter-
vention in Libya. Despite this promising start, the doctrine—designed to 
protect civilians from violence caused by their government or violence 
which the government is powerless to stop—has done nothing for the ci-
vilians in Syria. This Note explores the history of the Responsibility to 
Protect, identifies its flaws, analyzes proposed reforms, and ends with a 
suggested revision to the doctrine. This suggested revision would allow 
the political inertia of states to work for, rather than against, civilians. 
Introduction 
 On March 19, 2011, U.S. warplanes targeted and destroyed mili-
tary targets within Libya.1 President Barack Obama did not have Con-
gressional approval for such actions.2 Instead, President Obama relied 
upon authorization from the United Nations Security Council and later 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.3 Two days prior to the United 
States’ actions, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973, authoriz-
ing member countries and regional organizations to use all necessary 
measures to protect civilians in Libya.4 The resolution also imple-
mented a no-flight zone and called on member countries to enforce an 
arms embargo.5 On March 22, 2011, NATO indicated that it would en-
force the arms embargo,6 and by March 25, 2011, agreed to assume 
                                                                                                                      
 
* Steven Rose is a Managing Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 Jordan J. Paust, Constitutionality of U.S. Participation in the United Nations-Authorized War 
in Libya, 26 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 43, 44 (2012). 
2 See id. at 45–46, 55. 
3 Id. 
4 S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
5 Id. ¶¶ 6, 13. 
6 Press Release, Statement by the NATO Sec’y Gen. on Libya Arms Embargo (Mar. 22, 
2011), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71689.htm?mode=pressrelease; see 
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control over the international military effort.7 The United Nations-
backed intervention has been considered the clearest example of the 
emerging “responsibility to protect” doctrine.8 
 For more than two and a half years, conflict has raged in Syria, re-
sulting in an estimated 115,000 deaths as of October 2013.9 The rising 
death toll and recurrence of atrocities committed against civilians have 
led to a call by more than fifty countries to refer the situation in Syria 
for prosecution in the International Criminal Court (ICC).10 Despite 
this plea, neither the Security Council, NATO, nor any other regional 
organization has invoked the responsibility to protect doctrine to au-
thorize the use of force.11 
 Part I of this Note discusses the history of the conflict and inter-
vention in Libya and the history of the conflict in Syria. Part II deline-
ates the historic policy of non-intervention as well as the evolution and 
emergence of the responsibility to protect doctrine. Part III dissects two 
issues: whether the responsibility to protect doctrine is truly a responsi-
bility, thus entailing an affirmative duty to act; and whether a country 
can use this doctrine as justification to act in the absence of Security 
Council authorization. Finally, this Note argues that the responsibility 
to protect doctrine should be approached similarly to the doctrine of 
self-defense. 
                                                                                                                      
James G. Neuger, NATO to Intervene in Libyan Conflict, Enforce Arms Embargo, Bloomberg News 
(Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-22/nato-to-intervene-in-libyan-
conflict-enforce-arms-embargo-1-.html. 
7 Elisabeth Bumiller & David D. Kirkpatrick, NATO to Assume New Role in Libya, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 25, 2011, at A9. 
8 See Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 Stan. J. Int’l L. 319, 
330–32 (2012). 
9 Dominic Evans, More Than 115,000 Killed in Syrian Conflict–Monitoring Group, Reuters 
(Oct. 1, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/01/uk-syria-crisis-toll-idUKBRE9 
900KD20131001. 
10 Michelle Nichols, Over 50 Countries Ask Security Council to Refer Syria to Court, Reuters 
( Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/14/syria-crisis-un-icc-idUSL2N 
0AJ78L20130114. 
11 See Yara Bayoumy & Alistair Lyon, Syria Military Intervention No Closer Despite Rising 
Death Toll, Huffington Post ( Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/ 
01/04/syria-military-intervention_n_2407281.html; Louis Charbonneau, U.S. Gives Up on 
U.N. Security Council in Syria Crisis, Blames Russia, Reuters (Sep. 5, 2013), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/us-syria-crisis-un-usa-idUSBRE9840W420130905; Joe Ster-
ling & Salma Abdelaziz, As Unrest Spreads, Syrian Government Promises to Respond, CNN 
World (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/24/syria.unrest/. 
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I. Background 
A. Libya 
 On September 1, 1969, at age twenty-seven, Muammar Al-Gaddafi 
(Gaddafi) became the ruler of Libya following the overthrow of King 
Idris.12 For much of the following decades, Gaddafi’s relations with 
Western leaders were strained due to associations with extremist groups 
and suspicions of complicity in the 1998 bombing of Pan Am 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland.13 In the late 1990s, tensions with the West eased, 
prompting the U.N. to reduce the sanctions leveled against Libya by 
the U.N. in 2001.14 The spread of the political protests in Tunisia and 
Egypt, also known as the Arab Spring, however, did not leave Gaddafi 
immune.15 
 On January 14, 2011, twenty-eight days after the start of the Arab 
Spring, protesters forced Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, the president of Tu-
nisia out of office and out of the country.16 Fewer than two days later, 
Gaddafi condemned the uprisings in Tunisia, just as protests began in 
Libya.17 On February 11, 2011, more than two weeks of mass protests 
resulted in the removal from power of Hosni Mubarak, the former 
President of Egypt.18 
                                                                                                                      
 
12 Tara Kelly, Muammar Gaddafi Biography: The Rise and Fall of the Colonel, Huffington 
Post (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/20/muammar-gaddafi-
biography_n_1021902.html#s243765; Muammar al-Qaddafi Biography, Biography.com, 
http://www.biography.com/people/muammar-al-qaddafi-39014 (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) 
[hereinafter Qaddafi Biography]. Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi’s last name is frequently 
spelled either as “Qaddafi” or “Gaddafi.” See Zoe Fox, How Do You Spell ‘Gaddafi’? The Lin-
guistics Behind Libya’s Leader, Time (Feb. 23, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/ 
02/23/how-do-you-spell-gaddafi-the-linguistics-behind-libyas-leader/. This Note adopts the 
spelling “Gaddafi,” as used in prior issues of the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. See, e.g., Vanessa Arslanian, Beyond Revolution: Ending Lawlessness and Impunity 
During Revolutionary Periods, 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 121, 121 (2013). 
13 See Kelly, supra note 12; Qaddafi Biography, supra note 12. 
14 See Kelly, supra note 12; Qaddafi Biography, supra note 12. 
15 See Egypt-Inspired Protests Spread to Libya, Fox News (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www. 
foxnews.com/world/2011/02/16/anti-government-protests-spread-libya/. 
16 See Angelique Chrisafis & Ian Black, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali Forced to Flee Tunisia as Pro-
testers Claim Victory, Guardian ( Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ 
jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-protests; Edward Cody & Joby Warrick, Unrest Con-
tinues in Tunisia as President Ben Ali Flees Country, Wash. Post ( Jan. 15, 2011), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/14/AR2011011401131.html. 
17 Matthew Weaver, Muammar Gaddafi Condemns Tunisia Uprising, Guardian ( Jan. 16, 
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/16/muammar-gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-
uprising. 
18 See Chris McGreal & Jack Shenker, Hosni Mubarak Resigns–and Egypt Celebrates a New 
Dawn, Guardian (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/11/hosni-
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 The following weeks saw protests in Libya along with the use of 
military troops by Gaddafi in an attempt to quell the unrest, including 
an incident where two pilots from the Libyan Air Force defected to 
Malta, claiming that they had been ordered to bomb civilian protest-
ers.19 Navi Pillay, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, de-
cried the reports of violations of human rights, and called for the im-
mediate end to the use of machine guns, artillery, and aircraft on 
civilians in Libya.20 The Security Council passed a resolution on Febru-
ary 26, 2011, which demanded an end to the violations of international 
humanitarian law and attacks on civilians.21 The Security Council also 
voted unanimously to refer the situation in Libya to the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICC following reports of Gaddafi’s forces killing hun-
dreds of protesters.22 
 Even after this resolution, Gaddafi continued using the Libyan 
military in an attempt to defeat the rebels, whom he referred to as rats 
and armed gangs.23 The first push for outside use of force came on 
March 11, 2011, when then French President Nicholas Sarkozy called 
for the enforcement of a no-fly zone.24 President Sarkozy also suggested 
that the use of airstrikes to protect civilians in Libya may be justified.25 
                                                                                                                      
 
mubarak-resigns-egypt-cairo; Egypt Crisis: President Hosni Mubarak Resigns as Leader, BBC 
(Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12433045. 
19 See John Hooper & Ian Black, Libya Defectors: Pilots Told to Bomb Protesters Flee to Malta, 
Guardian (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/libya-pilots-
flee-to-malta; Christopher Scicluna, Two Libyan Fighter Pilots Defect, Fly to Malta, Reuters 
(Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/21/us-libya-protests-malta-idUS 
TRE71K52R20110221. 
20 See Ian Black, Gaddafi Urges Violent Showdown and Tells Libya ‘I’ll Die a Martyr,’ Guard-
ian (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/22/muammar-gaddafi-
urges-violent-showdown. 
21 See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
22 See id. ¶ 4; Press Release, Security Council, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Coun-
cil Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of 
Crackdown on Protesters; Situation Referred to International Criminal Court, U.N. Press 
Release SC/10187/Rev.1 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
23 Peter Beaumont, Ian Traynor & Nicholas Watt, Gaddafi Takes Key Towns as NATO 
Squabbles over Libya Action, Guardian (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
2011/mar/10/gaddafi-libya-nato; Qaddafi Vows To “Cleanse” Rebel-Held City of “Armed Gangs,” 
Fox News (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/03/16/libyan-forces-
bombard-rebels-east-west/. 
24 See Michael Gregory & Caren Bohan, Obama Says Gaddafi Squeezed, Libyan Rebels Want 
More, Reuters (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/11/us-libya-
idUSTRE7270JP20110311; Ruth Sherlock & Richard Spencer, Libya: France Risks NATO Split 
over Call for Gaddafi Talks, Telegraph (U.K.) ( July 11, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8630778/Libya-France-risks-Nato-split-over-
call-for-Gaddafi-talks.html; Nicholas Watt, Nicolas Sarkozy Calls for Air Strikes on Libya if Gad-
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 Within a week, the Security Council passed a resolution authoriz-
ing member countries to enforce a no-fly zone.26 The same resolution 
authorized member countries to use all necessary measures to protect 
civilians in Libya.27 Fewer than forty-eight hours after the Security 
Council passed Resolution 1973, British and American warships began 
firing cruise missiles against Libyan air defense systems.28 At the same 
time, French warplanes began operating over the opposition-held city 
Benghazi in Eastern Libya.29 British Prime Minister David Cameron 
proclaimed the strikes both legal and necessary to prevent Gaddafi 
from using his military against Libyan civilians.30 
 On February 24, 2011, the United States and other coalition na-
tions transferred command of the forces enforcing Resolution 1973 to 
NATO.31 While Admiral James Stavridis, NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe at the time, ran day-to-day operations, political 
oversight came not from NATO but from the individual member coun-
tries.32 President Obama did, however, issue a presidential finding that 
authorized the use and operation of covert U.S. forces within Libya to 
aid the rebel forces.33 
 After two weeks of air strikes, the United States withdrew its forces 
from NATO command, leaving the French and British forces conduct-
                                                                                                                      
dafi Attacks Civilians, Guardian (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ 
mar/11/nicolas-sarkozy-libya-air-strikes. 
25 See Watt, supra note 24. 
26 See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶¶ 6–12; Watt, supra note 24. 
27 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 4. 
28 See Chris Lawrence, U.S. Fires on Libyan Air Defense Targets, CNN (Mar. 19, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-19/world/libya.us.missiles_1_military-action-libyan-people-
pentagon-official?_s=PM:WORLD; Chris McGreal et al., Allied Strikes Sweep Libya as West Inter-
venes in Conflict, Guardian (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/ 
19/libya-air-strikes-gaddafi-france. 
29 See Airstrikes Begin on Libya Targets, Al Jazeera (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.aljazeera. 
com/news/africa/2011/03/2011319175243968135.html. 
30 See McGreal et al., supra note 28. 
31 See Robert Burns & Erica Werner, NATO Agrees to Take over Command of Libya No-Fly 
Zone, U.S. Likely to Remain in Charge of Brunt of Combat, Huffington Post (Mar. 24, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/24/nato-command-no-fly-libya-us-combat_n_ 
840408.html; NATO to Take over Libya No-fly Zone, CBS News (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www. 
cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20046982.html. 
32 See Nicholas Watt, Nick Hopkins & Ian Traynor, NATO to Take Control in Libya After 
US, UK and France Reach Agreement, Guardian (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.guardian.co. 
uk/world/2011/mar/22/libya-nato-us-france-uk. 
33 Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret Help for Libya Rebels, Reuters (Mar. 
30, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/30/us-libya-usa-order-idUSTRE72T6 
H220110330; Jake Trapper, Jon Karl & Russell Goldman, President Obama Authorizes Covert 
Help for Libyan Rebels, ABC News (Mar. 30, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/International/ 
president-obama-authorizes-covert-libyan-rebels/story?id=13259028. 
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ing the majority of the NATO missions.34 By this point, the NATO 
forces had destroyed thirty percent of Gaddafi’s military capabilities.35 
Eleven days later, President Obama recommitted U.S. troops to the 
NATO mission, issuing a joint statement with Britain and France indi-
cating that the mission would continue until Gaddafi left power.36 
 Around this time, the ICC Prosecutor revealed that investigators 
had uncovered evidence that Gaddafi developed plans for the inten-
tional use of lethal force against Libyan citizens.37 The investigators re-
ported that in fewer than two weeks, Gaddafi’s forces killed more than 
560 unarmed civilians.38 These reports raised concerns over the poten-
tial abduction, torture, and killing of civilians targeted as Gaddafi’s 
enemies.39 The ICC Prosecutor described these killings as systematic.40 
On June 27, 2011, the ICC issued warrants of arrest for Gaddafi and 
one of his sons.41 After two more months of fighting, anti-Gaddafi 
forces, backed by NATO airstrikes, launched an assault on the Libyan 
capital, Tripoli.42 
 Following the death of Muammar Gaddafi in mid-October, 2011,43 
NATO ended its mission in Libya.44 On March 8, 2012, the U.N. Hu-
                                                                                                                      
34 See Ian Traynor & Richard Norton-Taylor, NATO Lacking Strike Aircraft for Libya Cam-
paign, Guardian (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/05/nato-
lacking-strike-aircraft-libya. 
35 Id. 
36 See Mussab Al-Khairalla, Obama Says Libya in Stalemate, but “Gaddafi Will Go,” Reuters 
(Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/15/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20 
110415; Allegra Stratton, Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy: No Let-up in Libya Until Gaddafi De-
parts, Guardian (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/15/obama-
sarkozy-cameron-libya#history-link-box. 
37 See Aaron Gray-Block, Exclusive: Gaddafi Pre-planned Attacks on Civilians: Prosecutor, 
Reuters (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/05/us-libya-icc-exclusive-
idUSTRE73443V20110405. 
38 See id. 
39 Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11, 
Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar 
Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi ¶¶ 2–3 (May 16, 2011), http:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1073503.pdf. 
40 See id. 
41 Bruno Waterfield, ICC Issues Arrest Warrants for Gaddafi, His Son and Security Chief, 
Telegraph (U.K.) ( June 27, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaand 
indianocean/libya/8601400/ICC-issues-arrest-warrants-for-Gaddafi-his-son-and-security-chief. 
html. 
42 See Libyan Rebels Take Fight to Tripoli, CBS News (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.cbsnews. 
com/2100-202_162-20095027.html. 
43 Barry Malone, Gaddafi Killed in Hometown, Libya Eyes Future, Reuters (Oct. 20, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/us-libya-idUSTRE79F1FK20111020. 
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man Rights Council issued a report in which it documented violations 
of human rights law by Gaddafi’s forces, specifically: murder, rape, tor-
ture, and attacks on civilians and protected persons.45 
B. Syria 
 The unrest in the Middle East and North Africa spread to Syria in 
March 2011.46 In a day denoted “a day of rage,” civilians took to the 
streets demanding reform within the regime of Syrian President Bashar 
Al-Assad.47 Amid rising international criticism of the Syrian govern-
ment’s violent crackdown on the protesters, Assad promised reform 
and forced his cabinet to resign.48 Despite such assurances, protests 
continued, prompting a violent response from Assad’s forces.49 Reports 
indicated that forces loyal to Assad shot several Syrian soldiers who re-
fused to fire on protesters.50 Even Assad’s decision to end forty-eight 
years of emergency rule in April 2011 did not quell the protests.51 
 The first multinational action came on May 23, 2011, when the 
European Union imposed sanctions on Syria, as human rights groups 
estimated that more than 700 civilians had been killed to that date.52 
                                                                                                                      
 
44 CNN Wire Service, NATO Ending Libya Mission, CNN (Oct. 28, 2011), http://art 
icles.cnn.com/2011-10-28/africa/world_africa_belgium-nato-libya_1_nato-s-libya-moammar-
gadhafi-saif-al-islam-gadhafi?_s=PM:AFRICA. 
45 See generally Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Libya, U.N. Human Rights 
Council, 19th Sess., Feb. 25–Mar. 23, 2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/68 (Mar. 8, 2012) (out-
lining evidence of excessive use of force, unlawful killing, arbitrary detentions, torture, 
sexual violence, and attacks on civilians). 
46 See Sterling & Abdelaziz, supra note 11. 
47 Elizabeth Flock, Syria Revolution: A Revolt Brews Against Bashar al-Assad’s Regime, 
Wash. Post (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/syria-
revolution-revolt-against-bashar-al--assads-regime/2011/03/15/ABrwNEX_blog.html. 
48 Martin Chulov, Syrian President Sacks Cabinet in Effort to Quell Protests, Guardian (Mar. 
29, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/29/syrian-president-sacks-cabinet; 
Michael Slackman, Syria’s Cabinet Resigns; Concessions Expected, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 2011, at 
A12. 
49 See Katherine Marsh, Syrian Security Forces Crack Down on ‘Friday of Martyrs,’ Guardian 
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/01/syria-security-forces-crack 
down. 
50 Katherine Marsh, Syrian Soldiers Shot for Refusing to Fire on Protesters, Guardian (Apr. 12, 
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/12/syrian-soldiers-shot-protest; Douglas 
Stanglin, Activists: Syrian Army Units Fighting Each Other over Crackdown, USA Today (Apr. 28, 
2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/04/video-syrian-
soldiers-who-refuse-to-fire-on-civilians-are-being-shot/1#.UPzQmCc8B8E. 
51 See Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syria’s Assad Ends State of Emergency, Reuters (Apr. 21, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/21/us-syria-idUSTRE72N2MC20110421. 
52 Justyna Pawlak & David Brunnstrom, EU Imposes Sanctions on Syria’s Assad, Reuters 
(May 23, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/23/us-syria-idUSLDE73N02P 
20110523; Justyna Pawlak & David Brunnstrom, EU Imposes Sanctions on Syria’s Assad, 
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The next round of international action against Assad came on August 
18, 2011, when President Obama and the EU called for Assad’s resigna-
tion.53 President Obama also imposed further sanctions on Syria after 
reports by U.N. investigators indicated evidence of murder, torture, and 
abuse of children by Assad’s forces.54 On October 4, 2011, the Security 
Council voted on a resolution to impose sanctions on Syria, but Russia 
and China voted against the measure, which ultimately prevented its 
passage.55 Prior to the vote, the Security Council reworded the resolu-
tion three times in efforts to avoid such a veto, even removing the word 
“sanctions” from the proposed resolution.56 The United States blamed 
the veto on the Chinese and Russian desire to sell arms to the Syrian 
government.57 Russia vehemently denied this theory.58 At the time, 
Russia imported the largest amount of arms to Syria.59 In response, 
Russia expressed concern that the proposed resolution evinced a “phi-
losophy of confrontation,” and closed off opportunities for a peaceful 
settlement.60 The U.N. estimated at this time that approximately 2,700 
civilians died in the violence.61 By December 13, 2011, the death toll 
passed 5,000 people.62 Between the October 2011 veto and the Decem-
                                                                                                                      
Reuters (May 23, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/23/us-syria-idUSLDE 
73N02P20110523. 
53 See Joshua Hersh, Obama: Syrian President Assad Must Step Down, Huffington Post 
(Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/18/obama-assad_n_930229. 
html; Chris McGreal & Martin Chulov, Syria: Assad Must Resign, Says Obama, Guardian (Aug. 
18, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/18/syria-assad-must-resign-obama. 
54 See Jason Ukman & Liz Sly, Obama: Syrian President Assad Must Step Down, Wash. Post 
(Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/ 
obama-syrian-president-assad-must-step-down/2011/08/18/gIQAM75UNJ_blog.html. 
55 See Neil MacFarquhar, With Rare Double U.N. Veto on Syria, Russia and China Try to Shield 
Friend, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2011, at A6; Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails 
to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, 
Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China, U.N. Press Release SC/10403 (Oct. 4, 2011). 




59 See Thomas Grove & Erik Solomon, Russia Boosts Arms Sales to Syria Despite World Pres-
sure, Reuters (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/21/us-syria-russia- 
arms-idUSTRE81K13420120221. 
60 Russia and China Veto UN Resolution, supra note 56. 
61 Id. 
62 See Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syria Death Toll Hits 5,000, as Insurgency Spreads, Reuters 
(Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/us-syria-idUSTRE7B90F520 
111213. 
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ber report, the Arab League and the EU each imposed additional sanc-
tions.63 
 As protests and government violence persisted, the Security Coun-
cil once again attempted to pass a resolution condemning the violence 
and calling for its end.64 Russia and China also voted down this resolu-
tion.65 After the veto, the United States began flying unmanned aerial 
vehicles over Syria, strictly for observational purposes.66 NATO, how-
ever, issued a statement announcing that it had no intention to inter-
vene in Syria, even if the Security Council issued a mandate to protect 
civilians.67 
 By the end of February 2012, U.N. estimates put the civilian casu-
alty count in excess of 7,500 people.68 In April of that year, the U.N. 
Special Envoy, Kofi Annan, attempted to broker a ceasefire between 
Assad’s forces and the rebels.69 Despite these efforts, U.N. Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon announced more than a week later that Assad 
failed to implement the ceasefire measures.70 
 On April 21, 2012, the Security Council passed Resolution 2043, 
calling for all parties to abide by the peace plan, and authorizing a 
ninety-day monitoring mission by unarmed U.N. observers.71 By June 
16, 2012 the U.N. suspended its observer mission, due to increasing 
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danger to the observers.72 By then, U.N. estimates put the death toll 
upwards of ten thousand casualties.73 One month later, Russian and 
Chinese votes defeated a third Security Council resolution to impose 
sanctions on Syria.74 
 Fighting between Assad’s forces and the Syrian rebels continues as 
of the time of this writing, and U.N. estimates in October 2013, place 
the estimated civilian death toll at one hundred-fifteen thousand.75 
Over the past thirty months, the U.N. Human Rights Council has re-
peatedly condemned violations of international humanitarian law.76 
The Independent International Commission of Inquiry for the Syrian 
Arab Republic has also issued multiple reports detailing such violations, 
including extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, and the killing 
of children by Assad’s forces.77 As of October 2013, the U.N. has not 
authorized the use of force to ensure civilian safety.78 
                                                                                                                      
72 Mike Harrison, Violence in Syria Causes Suspension of UN Mission, Bloomberg News 
( June 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-16/un-suspends-observer-mis 
sion-in-syria-over-escalating-violence.html. 
73 See id. 
74 See Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N. as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria 
Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Jul. 20, 2012, at A8; Michelle Nichols, Russia, China Veto U.N. Security 
Council Resolution on Syria, Reuters ( July 19, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
07/19/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE86I0UD20120719. 
75 Evans, supra note 9. 
76 See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. S-19/1, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-19/1 ( June 1, 2012) 
(condemning in the strongest possible terms such an outrageous use of force against the 
civilian population); H.R.C. Res. S-18/1, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-18/1 (Dec. 2, 
2011) (strongly condemning the continued widespread, systematic, and gross violations of 
human rights by the Syrian authorities); H.R.C. Res. S-16/1, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 
RES/S-16/1 (Apr. 29, 2011) (unequivocally condemning the use of lethal force against 
peaceful protesters by the Syrian authorities). 
77 See, e.g., Oral Update of the Independent Int’l Comm. of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, Human Rights Council, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/CRP.1 ( June 26, 
2012) (detailing the massacre at Al-Houla); Rep. of the independent int’l comm. of in-
quiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Human Rights Council, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 
S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011) (outlining violations of international human rights law, 
international humanitarian law, and international criminal laws); Rep. of the United Na-
tions High Comm’r for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian 
Arab Republic, Human Rights Council, 18th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/53 (Sep. 15, 
2011) (detailing patterns of violence such as murder, disappearances, torture, deprivation 
of liberty, and persecution). 
78 Bayoumy & Lyon, supra note 11; Charbonneau, supra note 11; Sterling & Abdelaziz, 
supra note 11. 
2014] Moving Forward with the Responsibility to Protect 219 
II. Discussion 
A. Foundation of the Right to Protect 
 The international community founded the U.N. shortly after 
World War II79 with the main purpose of preventing the recurrence of 
war like that which had just ended.80 In the aftermath of the war, re-
spect for the sovereignty of nations, regardless of size or power, ensured 
peace.81 This respect for sovereignty is embodied in the U.N. Charter, 
which requires countries to refrain from the threat or use of force 
against other countries.82 Under the U.N. Charter, a country may only 
use force against another country in two circumstances: pursuant to 
authorization by the Security Council; or as necessary for self-defense.83 
The U.N. Charter further prohibits the U.N. from intervening in the 
domestic jurisdiction of a country, unless it is necessary for the mainte-
nance or restoration of international peace and security.84 In order to 
authorize measures taken against a country, including the use of force, 
nine of the fifteen members of the Security Council must vote for such 
use.85 Additionally, a single vote against such a measure by one of the 
permanent members of the Security Council will defeat the measure.86 
A country taking action in self-defense must report such actions to the 
Security Council, which retains the right to authorize other measures.87 
 From this doctrine of non-intervention the theory of the “respon-
sibility to protect” arose as a result of humanitarian crises in the 
1990s.88 The first of these crises was the Rwandan genocide in 1994, 
which exemplified the U.N.’s failure to act.89 In order to maintain 
peace and security during the transition of governments following the 
Arusha Peace Agreement, the U.N. sent a peacekeeping force of 2,548 
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troops to Rwanda.90 Canadian Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire, the 
Force Commander of the U.N. Peacekeepers in Rwanda specifically 
requested authorization to use force in the event of acts of crimes 
against humanity.91 The U.N. Headquarters never formally acted upon 
the requested rules of engagement.92 Following the death of Belgian 
soldiers, who at the time were members of the U.N. peacekeeping 
force, Belgium withdrew the remainder of its personnel from 
Rwanda.93 Following this withdrawal, the Security Council reduced the 
remaining peacekeeping force to 270 troops.94 It was not until half a 
million people died that the Security Council authorized action by the 
French military.95 In 2000, the Security Council accepted responsibility 
for not ending the genocide that killed 800,000 Rwandans.96 
 The international community reacted more swiftly in 1998 when 
violence broke out between Serbian forces and ethnic Albanians fight-
ing for an independent Kosovo.97 In response to such violence, the Se-
curity Council passed Resolution 1160, which called for peace talks and 
political dialogue, while also implementing an arms embargo.98 The 
violence continued despite the Security Council resolution, leading to 
another resolution that demanded a stop to the violence and indicated 
that further U.N. action may be taken if violence continued.99 Despite 
the push by the United States and other nations for the Security Coun-
cil to authorize the use of force, the Security Council took no such ac-
tion due to threats by Russia and China to veto resolutions authorizing 
force.100 Without authorization by the Security Council, NATO under-
took an air campaign against Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s 
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troops.101 Seventy-two days after the air campaign began, President Mil-
osevic agreed to a cease-fire plan.102 
B. A Modern Formulation of the Responsibility to Protect 
 In 2000, the former Secretary-General of the U.N., Kofi Annan 
delivered his Millennium Report.103 He designed this report to reflect 
on the progress made by the U.N. in the preceding years, while also 
identifying the areas requiring development and the future role of the 
U.N.104 In the report, the Secretary-General addressed criticism di-
rected at the calls for increased intervention to prevent or end humani-
tarian crises.105 The Secretary-General acknowledged the concerns that 
“humanitarian intervention” could be used to unnecessarily interfere 
with the internal affairs of another state, the possibility that a secession-
ist movement might deliberately induce human rights crimes to 
prompt outside intervention, and the inconsistent responses by coun-
tries when intervening.106 
 In response to these concerns, the Secretary-General posed a sim-
ple question: “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable 
assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Sre-
brenica–to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend 
every precept of our common humanity?”107 The Secretary-General 
explicitly rejected the use of national sovereignty as a shield for crimes 
against humanity, stating that the Security Council has a moral duty to 
act when peaceful efforts to stop such crimes have failed.108 
 Canada, along with major foundations, created the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to answer 
the question posed by Secretary-General Annan.109 The mandate of the 
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ICISS was to promote global political consensus about how to take ac-
tion through the U.N., reconciling state sovereignty and interven-
tion.110 The ICISS took the next step in the transition toward a respon-
sibility to protect doctrine in 2001 with the publication of its report, The 
Responsibility To Protect.111 This report is founded on the premise that 
sovereign countries have a responsibility to protect their citizens from 
avoidable humanitarian harm and when a country is incapable or un-
willing to do so, the responsibility passes to the international commu-
nity.112 
 The ICISS deliberately changed the terminology in the debate sur-
rounding humanitarian intervention from “the right to intervene” to 
“the right to protect.”113 In doing so, the ICISS hoped to focus on the 
needs of the civilians in need of protection.114 This also ensured the 
international community only bore the burden of the responsibility to 
protect when the civilians’ own country failed in its responsibility or 
became the perpetrator.115 By focusing on protection, rather than in-
tervention, the ICISS also hoped to emphasize the importance of pre-
ventative, as well as remedial, actions.116 
 In implementing the responsibility to protect doctrine, the ICISS 
identified three specific responsibilities: to prevent, to react, and to re-
build.117 The responsibility to prevent, as outlined by the ICISS, in-
volves actions taken by countries to prevent humanitarian crises.118 
Within this responsibility are three main elements: early warning, a 
“preventative toolbox,” and political will.119 The early warning element 
refers to systems designed to detect the precursors to such crises, along 
with the identification of root causes of potential conflicts in order to 
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enable organizations to prevent their occurrence.120 The “preventative 
toolbox” described by the ICISS is the range of direct prevention efforts 
available.121 Such efforts include political and diplomatic efforts, eco-
nomic support or sanctions, legal recourse such as arbitration or adju-
dication before the ICC, and military action.122 
 The ICISS identified the responsibility to react in the event that 
preventative measures have proven ineffective or an offending country 
refuses to redress a situation as the core of a responsibility to protect.123 
The ICISS preferred measures short of military intervention, including 
the use of sanctions targeting the offending government or organiza-
tion, or arms embargos.124 The ICISS recognized military intervention 
as an acceptable measure, limited to extreme cases.125 The ICISS iden-
tified six criteria for the use of military force: right authority; just cause; 
right intention; last resort; proportional means; and reasonable pros-
pects.126 Of these criteria, the two most important are just cause and 
right authority.127 
 With regard to just cause, in the view of the ICISS there are only 
two sets of circumstances which would justify resorting to military force 
under a responsibility to protect doctrine.128 Such circumstances are a 
large scale loss of life—as the product of state action, or the inability of 
a state to act—and a large scale “ethnic cleansing” through killing, 
forced expulsion, terror, or rape.129 The ability to use military action as 
a preventative measure is necessary to enable countries to prevent 
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genocides and other atrocities, rather than being required to wait until 
such atrocities begin before taking action.130 
 The primary authority for sanctioning the use of military force in 
the context of the responsibility to protect is the Security Council, ac-
cording to the ICISS.131 The U.N. Charter contains explicit prohibi-
tions on intervention, with no exception for humanitarian interests.132 
As such, Security Council authorization must be sought prior to any 
military intervention, though the Security Council also has a responsi-
bility to deal expediently with such requests.133 The ICISS did suggest a 
reform to the Security Council, due to the ability of any of the perma-
nent members to hold hostage any vote authorizing the use of force.134 
This reform consists of the adoption of a code of conduct regarding 
the use of the veto on votes authorizing the use of force in response to 
large scale losses of life.135 The code would call upon the permanent 
members to refrain from vetoing an otherwise majority vote on such an 
authorization, if the member did not have significant state interests at 
stake.136 The ICISS did recognize that due to conflicts between the 
permanent five members, or differences in opinion as to how to react 
to a particular situation, the Security Council may be unable or unwill-
ing to act.137 In such a circumstance, the ICISS envisions a role for the 
U.N. General Assembly, or a regional organization such as NATO to 
act.138 
 The final responsibility inherent to a responsibility to protect is 
rebuilding.139 This responsibility refers not only to the reconstruction 
of infrastructure which was destroyed, but also the reconstruction of 
the society impacted.140 The ICISS identified the reintegration and rec-
onciliation of former combatants as the most important form of re-
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building.141 The most effective way to achieve such reconciliation is not 
by having the rebuilding efforts performed only by the interveners, but 
by the former combatants themselves.142 Rather than focusing on the 
actual construction of infrastructure, the primary responsibility of the 
intervening forces is to provide security throughout the process, includ-
ing rebuilding local police and security forces.143 The long-term goals 
of the intervening countries are the development and growth of the 
affected state.144 As such, the intervening countries have a responsibil-
ity to end economic and other non-military sanctions which had been 
imposed on the affected state.145 
 The report by the ICISS ended with a series of suggestions for both 
the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council.146 These recom-
mendations included adopting the principals outlined by the report, a 
definition of the threshold for military action, and the agreement by 
the permanent members of the Security Council regarding the use of 
the veto power in calls for military intervention to preserve human 
life.147 While the U.N. has not implemented all of the recommenda-
tions by the ICISS, the ideas contained within the report have been in-
fluential in the international community.148 
C. Modern Implementations of the Responsibility to Protect 
 After the U.N. World Summit in 2005, the U.N. General Assembly 
affirmed the idea that a country is responsible for the protection of its 
citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity in its World Summit Outcome document.149 In one 
breath the General Assembly affirmed the concept of international ac-
tion when a country fails in this duty to protect, and reaffirmed the ne-
cessity of a Security Council resolution to authorize military action.150 
The General Assembly expressly advocated for states to participate in 
the implementation of responsibility to protect doctrine through re-
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gional and sub-regional groups.151 The adoption of these principals was 
well received in the international community, even called “the only un-
equivocal success in September 2005.”152 The U.N. describes the re-
sponsibility to protect as standing for the proposition that a country 
can no longer use state sovereignty as a shield from outside interfer-
ence in the event of genocide or other crimes against humanity.153 
 Since the adoption of the Summit Outline, the U.N. Secretary-
General held one formal debate and two informal interactive dialogues 
to better define the extent and application of the responsibility to pro-
tect.154 In 2009, the U.N. Secretary-General identified three pillars es-
sential to his plan for implementing a responsibility to protect: first, the 
protection responsibilities of the state; second, international assistance 
and capacity-building; and third, timely and decisive response.155 In a 
report two years later, the Secretary-General focused on the importance 
of using regional and sub-regional groups to implement his three pil-
lars.156 The Secretary-General indicated that participation by regional 
and sub-regional groups was important in each of the dozen situations 
in which responsibility to protect ideals had been implemented in the 
previous three years.157 A global-regional-sub-regional partnership is 
considered the “surest path for advancing the responsibility to protect 
[doctrine].”158 
 The responsibility to protect doctrine has proven to be more than 
mere words since its inception, with the U.N. Secretary-General citing 
the use of responsibility to protect principals as informing U.N. actions 
in Darfur, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Côte d’Ivoire, Yemen, Abyei, Syria, and 
Libya.159 In each situation except Libya, the responsibility to protect 
took effect without the use of military force.160 
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 In 2004, the Security Council exercised its Chapter VII powers to 
create the U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).161 UNOCI’s 
mandate included monitoring the ceasefire, monitoring the movement 
of armed groups, assisting in disarmament, demobilization, reintegra-
tion, repatriation, resettlement, and assistance in the fields of human 
rights and law and order.162 In 2010, Côte d’Ivoire was set to hold its 
first election in ten years after the former president Laurent Gbagbo 
postponed elections six times following the end of his term in 2005.163 
After the U.N. certified vote, the electoral commission named Gbagbo’s 
challenger, Alassane Ouattara the winner.164 Despite the U.N. declaring 
Ouattara the winner, Gbagbo refused to leave office, naming his own 
cabinet.165 For nearly six months following the election, forces loyal to 
Gbagbo and Ouattara battled throughout Côte d’Iviore.166 
 On March 30, 2011, the Security Council passed Resolution 1975, 
which reiterated the responsibility of the government of Côte d’Ivoire 
to protect its civilians, and authorized the UNOCI to use ‘all necessary 
means’ to protect civilians.167 Five days later, UNOCI forces targeted 
and destroyed military installations belonging to Gbagbo in the city of 
Abidjan.168 Within hours of this operation, Gbagbo’s forces either de-
serted or negotiated for surrender.169 A week later, former president 
Gbagbo was captured by forces loyal to Ouattara.170 Gbagbo is currently 
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awaiting trial for crimes against humanity before the ICC, which found 
him fit to stand trial.171 
 During the 2011 uprising in Libya, the international response to 
Gaddafi’s actions was a near unanimous condemnation.172 When the 
Security Council adopted resolution 1970, enacting an arms embargo 
against Libya, it specifically referred to the responsibility of the Libyan 
authorities to protect the Libyan population.173 When the Security 
Council adopted resolution 1973, fewer than three weeks later, it relied 
upon the responsibility to protect as justification for authorizing the 
use of force and the implementation of a no-fly zone.174 In authorizing 
the use of force, the Security Council asserted authority under Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter, even though it did not specifically cite a threat 
to international peace.175 
III. Analysis 
A. Remaining Questions 
 There are several questions still remaining from the modern im-
plementation of the responsibility to protect.176 The first of these arises 
from the name of the doctrine itself: does the responsibility to protect 
actually constitute a responsibility?177 That is, does it impose an obliga-
tion to act?178 By the language of the ICISS report, it is clear that each 
country has an affirmative action to protect its own citizens.179 The 
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ICISS makes clear that other countries face a responsibility to protect 
only when the host country fails in its own responsibilities.180 The U.N. 
adopted both of these premises in its 2005 World Summit Outcome.181 
It is less clear, however, whether other countries have an affirmative 
duty to act when the host country fails in its responsibilities.182 
 The language in the ICISS report may signal the existence of such 
an affirmative duty, including the statement “[w]hen preventative 
measures fail to resolve or contain the situation and when a state is un-
able or unwilling to redress the situation, then interventionary meas-
ures by other members of the broader community of states may be re-
quired.”183 In discussing the use of military force in a responsibility to 
protect scenario, the ICISS is similarly definitive in stating that in cer-
tain situations other countries are required to act when a host country 
has degenerated to the point that massacre, genocide, or other ethnic 
cleansings are possible.184 The corresponding paragraphs in the World 
Summit Report are less forceful than the ICISS report, stating only that 
the international community, acting through the U.N., has the respon-
sibility to use appropriate means, including military force if authorized 
by the Security Council.185 The retreat from a more forceful obligation 
is striking due to the fact that a lack of political commitment was the 
primary reason for the U.N.’s failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda.186 
 The ICISS report also goes beyond the World Summit Outcome by 
addressing a situation in which the Security Council refuses or fails to 
act.187 The ICISS identified several avenues of action for countries to 
implement the responsibility to protect in such an event—namely ac-
tion by the U.N. General Assembly, action by a regional or sub-regional 
group against a member country, or action by a regional group against 
a non-member country followed by seeking ad hoc authorization by the 
General Assembly or Security Council.188 The ICISS recognized that 
failure of the Security Council to act would not necessarily cause other 
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countries to rule out taking action despite the lack of authorization.189 
More importantly, the report recognized that such a failure would 
damage the credibility and stature of the U.N. as a whole.190 
 Despite these concerns, the U.N., through the World Summit Out-
come, does not specifically address states’ obligations in the event that 
the Security Council does not act.191 The World Summit Outcome 
states that military actions are to be implemented through the Security 
Council’s Chapter VII authority, even though it leaves open the possi-
bility of countries taking non-military actions similar to those outlined 
in the ICISS report.192 While no affirmative duty to implement the re-
sponsibility to protect doctrine exists, a customary norm may be devel-
oping that requires some form of action that is less than the use of mili-
tary force.193 State practice lends support to the conclusion that no 
positive duty exists to use military force, even when authorized by the 
Security Council, reflected in the language used in the resolution, 
which authorizes rather than mandates the use of force.194 Indeed, the 
only Security Council resolution authorizing member countries to use 
force resulted in action taken only by NATO.195 It appears that at this 
time the term “responsibility” is a misnomer, imposing no affirmative 
duty to protect.196 
 The second remaining question is whether, and to what extent, a 
country or regional organization may take action to implement the re-
sponsibility to protect without U.N. authorization.197 At first glance the 
language of the ICISS report appears to foreclose the possibility of tak-
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ing action without authorization.198 This requirement for authorization 
is supported by the U.N. Charter itself, which recognizes only two in-
stances involving the legal use of force against another country: as au-
thorized by the Security Council exercising its Chapter VII authority, or 
in self-defense.199 The Secretary-General of the U.N. has endorsed this 
interpretation of the responsibility to protect by requiring Security 
Council authorization for military action.200 The weight of scholarly 
works also falls on the side of declaring unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention in contravention to the U.N. Charter and international law.201 
Among the primary concerns underlying the prohibition on action 
without U.N. authorization is the potential to use humanitarian inter-
vention as a pretext for war.202 
 Although such arguments appear to end the inquiry, the ICISS 
report specifically addresses scenarios in which the use of force may be 
appropriate absent Security Council authorization.203 One of the major 
flaws identified by the ICISS in relying on the Security Council as the 
sole authority for military force is the possibility that the Security 
Council will fail to act.204 Specifically, the ICISS identified the possibility 
for the U.N. General Assembly to convene in an emergency special ses-
sion under the “Uniting for Peace” procedures.205 The General Assem-
bly does not have the authority possessed by the Security Council to 
enable military action, although such a meeting could give legitimacy— 
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if not legality—to the actions.206 The biggest drawback to this proce-
dure is the improbability that the required two-thirds majority could be 
assembled to legitimize actions taken without Security Council ap-
proval.207 
 The ICISS also foresaw a role for regional and sub-regional organi-
zations to implement the responsibility to protect.208 The U.N. Secre-
tary-General echoed the important role of regional and sub-regional 
groups in ensuring the responsibility to protect is carried out, calling 
more effective collaboration with such groups a “key plank” in his strat-
egy to implement the responsibility.209 Although the ICISS report spe-
cifically contemplates leeway in allowing regional or sub-regional 
groups to take military action and seeking Security Council authoriza-
tion after the fact,210 the role envisioned for such groups by the Secre-
tary-General predicates any military action upon prior Security Council 
authorization.211 
 Allowing regional and sub-regional organizations such as NATO or 
the African Union to take action against member countries has signifi-
cant advantages.212 Not only are these organizations typically in a better 
position to act, but they also often have a greater understanding of the 
context and background of the issues giving rise to the need for inter-
vention.213 Moreover, some regional and sub-regional groups have ex-
pressly given themselves the right to intervene in the event of humanitar-
ian crises, without expressly requiring Security Council authorization.214 
This ability presents a solution to the problem of a lack of political com-
mitment by the Security Council and minimizes the risk of pretextual 
war, because the intervening countries may be subject to intervention 
themselves.215 Regional groups also have the ability to set higher levels of 
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humanitarian standards and have the most at stake to ensure the main-
tenance of such standards.216 
 There is a more fundamental problem with assuming that the lan-
guage of the ICISS report and the U.N. Charter prohibit intervention 
without prior authorization because such an assumption focuses only 
on implementation of the responsibility to protect through its last re-
sort: military intervention.217 The responsibility to protect is not a 
choice between sitting idly by and using military force to intervene.218 
In fact, both the ICISS and the Secretary-General focused on the use of 
force only as a last resort, preferring less or non-coercive means to up-
hold the responsibility to protect.219 Even within the coercive measures 
identified, the use of military force is but one option, less preferable 
than economic, political, and military sanctions.220 Unlike the prohibi-
tion on the use of force without Security Council authorization or in 
self-defense, the U.N. Charter does not prohibit sanctions to uphold its 
principles, even those the U.N. does not specifically authorize.221 In 
addition to individual countries imposing unilateral economic sanc-
tions, the U.N. Charter allows regional or sub-regional groups to do the 
same.222 
 The ability of regional groups to impose economic sanctions has 
been reinforced most markedly by the response of the U.N. and the 
Secretary-General to the Arab League’s suspension of Libya.223 This 
suspension preceded a similar suspension by the U.N. General Assem-
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bly, and both suspensions took place before any action by the Security 
Council.224 Notably, the Secretary-General did not condemn such uni-
lateral action, but rather held it out as an instance of cooperation be-
tween regional and global organizations, and suggested expanding the 
use of such actions.225 Similarly, Syria has remained suspended from 
the Arab League, despite the lack of Security Council action.226 Like 
the Arab League, the EU recently renewed its own sanctions against 
Syria.227 These economic measures are the type of targeted sanctions 
envisioned by the ICISS because they continue the arms embargo 
against Syria while allowing “non-lethal” aid to the civilian popula-
tion.228 Not only did these sanctions come without Security Council 
authorization, but they came only months after the Security Council 
vetoed a resolution to impose economic sanctions on Syria.229 Actions 
to implement the responsibility to protect which do not involve military 
action, therefore, enjoy greater acceptance than using military force 
without Security Council authorization, which remains potentially le-
gitimate, but not legal.230 
B. Moving the Responsibility to Protect Forward 
 Scholars have offered varied suggestions for reforms to make the 
responsibility to protect doctrine more efficacious.231 The ICISS in its 
report suggested a modification to the veto power exercised by the 
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permanent members of the Security Council.232 The ICISS found it 
unconscionable that one permanent member, through the exercise of 
its veto power, could effectively overrule the opinion of the rest of the 
world about issues of humanitarian concern.233 To address these con-
cerns, the ICISS suggested that the permanent members agree to a 
code of conduct, in which they would forgo the use of their veto powers 
for resolutions to end or prevent a humanitarian crisis unless their own 
vital national interests were at stake.234 Although one draft of the World 
Summit Outcome included an invitation to the permanent members to 
refrain from using their veto powers on resolutions dealing with crimes 
implicating the responsibility to protect, this language was cut from the 
final document.235 Adoption of such a proposal would prevent the uni-
lateral veto of an otherwise approved resolution.236 Such a change 
would not be a perfect solution, particularly for the “overriding failure” 
of the U.N. action or inaction in Rwanda—the lack of political will.237 
In the ongoing situation in Syria, despite the fact that a proposed reso-
lution garnered eleven of fifteen possible affirmative votes, it still took 
more than four months for a Security Council statement simply con-
demning the violence in Syria.238 
 Another suggested development for the responsibility to protect is 
a shift in the oversight responsibility to regional or sub-regional 
groups.239 The basis for this reform would be to allow regional or sub-
regional groups to develop independent human rights standards, and 
would predicate non-intervention of the regional group on the main-
tenance of these standards.240 This reform however, possesses several 
problems.241 As articulated, the change lacks any timetable for the de-
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velopment for such human rights standards.242 More concerning is the 
fact that it does nothing to solve the overriding failure leading to the 
genocide in Rwanda because it still requires other members of the re-
gional group to have the political will to act.243 Unlike the U.N., the 
neighboring countries within the regional or sub-regional group may 
not wish to take steps to intervene, knowing that they may face the 
same intervention in the future.244 Notably, the African Union rejected 
the Security Council-authorized intervention in Libya, even though its 
charter includes the right to economic and political intervention in 
member countries which failed to comply with its decisions and poli-
cies.245 
 A final unsatisfactory proposal is the development and adoption of 
a binding agreement that outlines the responsibility to protect doctrine 
and constrains the signatories to its terms.246 Such an agreement would 
predicate intervention under the responsibility to protect doctrine on 
the occurrence of one of the events outlined in the World Summit 
Outcome: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity.247 The proposed agreement goes on to say that if the Secu-
rity Council becomes aware of the occurrence of one of these events, it 
can presume the host country has manifestly failed to protect its civil-
ians.248 The proposed agreement further adopts a version of the re-
forms to the Security Council veto power described above.249 Such a 
reform would prohibit a permanent member of the Security Council 
                                                                                                                      
242 See id. 
243 See Rwanda Report, supra note 90, at 30. 
244 See Responsibility to Protect, supra note 109, at 54. 
245 See George Grant, Libya and the African Union: Right in Principle, Wrong in Practice, 
Telegraph (U.K.) (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africa 
andindianocean/libya/8445465/Libya-and-the-African-Union-Right-in-Principle-Wrong-in-
Practice.html. Article 23 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union provides that “any 
Member State that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be 
subjected to other sanctions . . . and other measures of a political and economic nature to 
be determined by the Assembly.” African Union Constitutive Act art. 23, para 2. 
246 See Focarelli, supra note 176, at 202–03; Letter from John R. Bolton, supra note 235 
(indicating that states are reluctant to enter into such a binding agreement). 
247 See Summit Outcome, supra note 149, ¶ 138. 
248 Tessa Davis, Note, Taking International Law at its Word and Its Spirit: Re-Envisioning Re-
sponsibility to Protect as a Binding Principle of International Law, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 883, 
899–905 (2011)(arguing for the adoption of a binding legal principal of the responsibility 
to protect). Though the presumption created by such evidence would be rebuttable, the 
proposed agreement does not lay out how a State would rebut this presumption. Id. The 
World Summit Outcome requires that a State be “manifestly failing to protect [its] popula-
tions” before the Security Council could authorize the use of force. Summit Outcome, 
supra note 149, ¶ 139. 
249 Davis, supra note 148, at 903–05. 
2014] Moving Forward with the Responsibility to Protect 237 
from using its veto power upon the occurrence of a triggering event, 
unless vital national interests of the permanent member are at stake.250 
Though the proposed agreement has the benefit of narrowly tailoring 
its reforms on the veto power, it is unlikely that the permanent mem-
bers would agree any more easily to a binding resolution depriving 
them of their veto power in even a limited role,251 given that they made 
clear that they did not want to heed the call for an informal agreement 
to produce the same restrictions.252 
 There is, however, a different way to deal with the problems— no-
tably, the forestalling of Security Council action due to a lack of politi-
cal will—plaguing the responsibility to protect doctrine.253 The respon-
sibility to protect should be implemented in a manner similar to self-
defense, adapted to the requirements of the responsibility.254 This pro-
posal incorporates the threshold incidents from the World Summit 
Outcome, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against 
humanity, before giving rise to a right to take military action.255 Limit-
ing the trigger events to these crimes gives clear limits to when the re-
sponsibility may be invoked, avoiding the broad definitions from the 
ICISS report.256 As identified by the Secretary-General, information 
regarding the occurrence of these events is rarely lacking.257 This pro-
posed implementation of the responsibility to protect also incorporates 
the precautionary principals outlined in the ICISS report, motivation to 
halt human suffering, last resort, the use of means proportionate to the 
objective, and reasonable prospects for success.258 
 This proposed implementation of the responsibility to protect dif-
fers from the current model or other proposed changes in its determi-
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nation of when a country may intervene.259 Similar to the doctrine of 
self-defense under the U.N. Charter, a country would be allowed to in-
tervene following the occurrence of one of the threshold events, until 
the Security Council takes action.260 Drawing further from the self-
defense doctrine, any country taking such action would be required to 
report its actions to the Security Council.261 After reporting, the coun-
try taking action to protect the civilians of the host country would be 
allowed to continue to act until the Security Council acts.262 By imple-
menting the responsibility to protect in this way, the inertia of the Secu-
rity Council, along with any lack of political will to act, would work to 
the benefit of the civilians in danger.263 
 This proposal would also benefit from a built-in protection against 
a country claiming to implement the responsibility to protect doctrine 
as a pretext for other motives.264 Because the subject of a Security 
Council resolution mandating intervention be replaced with peaceable 
dispute resolution mechanisms would be the country or countries in-
tervening, those countries would not have a vote on the Security Coun-
cil resolution.265 As such, if the country taking protective acts under the 
responsibility to protect doctrine is a permanent member of the Secu-
rity Council, that country could not use its position to automatically 
veto any resolution ordering it to withdraw its troops.266 Moreover, if 
the protective actions are taken by a regional or sub-regional group, 
such as NATO, the resolution can incorporate the participating con-
stituent states so as to ensure that they could not veto the resolution.267 
This adaptation of the self-defense doctrine would also benefit from the 
U.N. Charter’s notice provision: any time a country takes action under 
this proposed implementation, they would be required to report it to 
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the Security Council, ensuring that the Security Council would be 
aware of the events and could pass a resolution.268 
 Another protective measure that could be implemented in a new 
proposal would be a “heads-up” notice requirement.269 Under such a 
requirement, before a country may take protective actions, it must give 
notice of its mission objectives and plan for engagement, within a speci-
fied timeframe—for instance four weeks—prior to implementing those 
plans.270 This period would serve several purposes, including giving 
both the acting country or countries and the U.N. time to continue 
gathering information to ensure that the host country has in fact mani-
festly failed to protect its civilians.271 This notice period would also al-
low the Security Council to act before the intervening countries began 
operations—either explicitly authorizing such actions, or requiring use 
of a pacific resolution mechanism—pursuant to U.N. Charter Article 
48.272 The Security Council could modify the intervening states’ out-
lined objectives and plans, such as encouraging countries to use non-
military measures like an arms embargo or a no-flight zone.273 
 The main benefit of this proposed reform to the responsibility to 
protect comes from its effect on a situation in which the Security Coun-
cil fails to act.274 Under current implementations of the responsibility 
to protect doctrine, the Security Council’s failure to act prohibits coun-
tries from taking military action.275 By contrast, in the proposed im-
plementation, such inertia would allow countries to offer protection 
until the Security Council chose to act, rather than require the world to 
stand by idly.276 
 The ongoing situation in Syria serves as a prime example of the 
potential effects of this proposed reform.277 The Security Council has 
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voted on three resolutions aimed at ending the violence in Syria—all 
three of which have been vetoed by Russia and China.278 As a result, an 
estimated 115,000 people have been killed as of October 2013.279 Un-
der the proposed reforms to the responsibility, countries which devel-
oped mission objectives and plans and gave the Security Council suffi-
cient notice could take protective action unless the Security Council 
prohibited such countries from acting.280 This proposed reform would 
repurpose the lack of political will and allow the responsibility to pro-
tect doctrine to focus on the proper goal, “the requirements of those 
who need or seek assistance,”281 while building in safeguards against 
abuse of the system.282 
Conclusion 
 The responsibility to protect doctrine is the next step in the evolu-
tion of the role of the U.N. and the international community in pro-
tecting civilians from the worst abuses. The U.N. was born out of a de-
sire to prevent future wars. Kosovo and Rwanda were poignant lessons 
of occasions when a civilian’s greatest threat comes from his or her own 
government, especially behind the shield of sovereignty. The answer 
came in the form of the responsibility to protect doctrine, affirming the 
need for a government to protect its citizens from the worst crimes, and 
laid the foundation for international response in the event the host 
country failed in its responsibility. Although problems still exist with the 
doctrine, implementing the responsibility to protect doctrine as a 
modified form of self-defense will use the inertia of the political process 
to protect civilians. The need for such a reform is, unfortunately, 
heightened by the more than 115,000 killed in Syria, as the world 
watches, estopped from intervening by politics in the Security Council. 
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